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The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental Disorders (1952), now generally known as 
the DSM-I, attracts little attention in the current literature. The received view is that this 
system was a relatively unimportant, psychoanalytically-oriented classification.  For example, 
Allan Horwitz (2015) claimed that  
All of the approximately 100 diagnostic definitions in the DSM-I were short, cursory, 
and infused with psychodynamic assumptions. (Horwitz, 2015, p.2)  
In her history of the DSM-III Hannah Decker stated 
Little attention was paid to the first two DSMs, which were published mainly for 
psychiatrists in state mental hospitals who were interested in compiling a variety of 
statistical information on their patients’ lives and deaths. (Decker, 2013, p.xvii) 
Gerald Grob, whose (1991) “Origins of DSM-I: A Study in Appearance and Reality” remains 
the seminal discussion of this classification, noted  
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The publication of DSM-I marked an internal transformation that mirrored the 
growing dominance of psychodynamic and psychoanalytic psychiatry and the relative 
weakness of the biological tradition. (Grob, 1991, p.421)  
The goal of this paper is to challenge this received history. We will argue that the DSM-I was 
not psychoanalytic; rather it was eclectic, owing as much to Kraepelin as Freud. In addition, 
the DSM-I was used frequently in its time. Copies circulated widely, and the manual went 
through twenty printings (A.P.A., 1968, p.ix). In short, the DSM-I was much more like recent 
editions of the DSM than generally thought. This matters because modern writers have often 
severed later editions of the DSM from their historical context. Conceiving of the DSM-I as 
psychoanalytic and professionally unimportant has led to it being dismissed as a mere artefact 
of a long gone era. DSM-I and II are presented as having only their name in common with 
later editions, and the current epoch in psychiatry seems to start in 1980.
 
 For some this has 
resulted in an assumption that the classificatory strategies of the more recent DSMs delineate 
the only ways in which “right thinking” psychiatrists have ever divided up the domain of 
psychopathology. For others (critics of the DSM) the idea that the current DSM categories 
appeared from nowhere around a committee table in the late 1970s has facilitated their too-
easy dismissal (compare, for example, Maxmen, 1985, p.35 and Whitaker, 2010, pp. 269-
271; Shorter, 2015, p2). In our history, the continuities between the first DSMs (and earlier 
classifications) and the more recent editions DSMs become much more visible.  
 
1. The DSM-I was not a psychoanalytic classification 
We start by raising four initial points that should make readers doubt that the DSM-I 
can be characterized as psychoanalytic. With a prima facie case established, we then 
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turn to consider the way in which the DSM-I was developed. Demonstrating the 
influence that various prior classifications had on the DSM-I will further support our 
argument. 
 
1.1. The DSM-I was not a psychoanalytic classification – the prima facie case. 
1.1.1. Psychoanalysts did not write the DSM-I  
The DSM-I included a list of twenty-eight individuals who served for some portion of time 
on the APA Committee of Nomenclature and Statistics between 1946 and 1951 (A.P.A., 
1952, p.xii). These are the individuals who were credited with producing the DSM-I. The 
Biographical Directory of the American Psychiatric Association for 1950 contained details 
regarding twenty-five of these individuals (the other three had died prior to 1950). Of these 
25, only seven (28%) had either trained as psychoanalysts, or were members of 
psychoanalytic societies (specifically, George N. Raines, Moses M. Frohlich, Franz 
Alexander, Norman Q. Brill, Jacob H. Friedman, Nolan D. C. Lewis and George S. Sprague). 
Of the three committee members whose details cannot be found in the 1950 Biographical 
Directory, the obituary of Jacob Kasanin listed him as a member of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association  (Anonymous, 1946). Clarence O. Cheney and James V. May 
were one-time Presidents of the APA and the American Journal of Psychiatry contains 
extensive obituaries for them (APA, 1949a). These obituaries make no mention of any 
psychoanalytic training, or membership of psychoanalytic societies, and these two were thus 
almost certainly not psychoanalysts. This means that only 29% of the 28 individuals 
responsible for the DSM-I can be characterized as psychoanalysts. 
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The 1950 Biographical Directory also provides details of place of work and publications. The 
twenty-eight committee members had diverse interests (as catalogued in Anonymous, 1946; 
APA, 1949a; APA 1950). Many had military experience (notably Norman Brill, John 
Caldwell, J.P.S. Cathcart, Jacob Friedman, Moses Frohlich, Baldwin Keyes, George Raines). 
Others had worked for the Veteran’s Administration (notably John Baird, George Brewster, 
Moses Frohlich, Harvey Tompkins). At least three had worked in State Mental Hospitals 
(Clarence O’Cheney, Jacob Kasanin, James May). There were notable neurologists (John 
Baird, Walter Breutsch, Norman Brill, Houston Merritt, Robert Schwab). Neil Dayton and 
James May had long standing interests in classification and epidemiology. Baldwin Keyes 
and Mabel Ross were child psychiatrists; Lawrence Kolb was a specialist on addictions; 
Abram Bennett and Walter Breutsch worked on somatic therapies. 
Members of the committee were assigned to small groups, each of which was responsible for 
some section of the manual, for example, one group was responsible for the nomenclature of 
psychoneuroses, another for the psychoses of unknown origin, and so on (Menninger, 1963, 
p.475). Committee members would most likely have been allocated to groups where their 
expertise was greatest, making it probable that psychoanalysts would have greater input into 
certain sections of the manual. Still, given that overall less than one third of the committee 
members were psychoanalysts, and that the committee members had a wide range of 
interests, the DSM-I cannot be considered a psychoanalytic classification in the sense of 
having been written by analysts. 
 
1.1.2. Psychoanalysts did not use the DSM-I 
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The DSM-I cannot be considered a psychoanalytic classification in the sense of being a 
classification used by psychoanalysts, as psychoanalysts in the 1950s tended not to 
employ the DSM-I. Between 1954 and 1958 a committee of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association tried to collect statistical data with the aim of measuring the effectiveness of 
psychoanalysis  in treating particular conditions (Weinstock, 1965). They decided to use 
DSM-I  to code the diagnosis of the patients. Psychoanalysts participating in the study were 
each sent a free copy, suggesting that psychoanalysts were unaccustomed to using DSM 
diagnoses. Early in the course of the study it became apparent that the psychoanalysts were 
unwilling or unable to use the DSM diagnoses. Fewer and fewer psychoanalysts returned 
their forms. Many of those who did continue to participate either left the diagnosis 
unspecified or used the same diagnosis, most often passive-aggressive personality, 
compulsive personality or pseudoneurotic schizophrenia  (which was not  a  DSM-I 
diagnosis) for all their patients. Others abandoned the diagnostic section of the questionnaires 
altogether. In addition to finding the DSM unusable, the psychoanalysts were uninterested in 
developing their own diagnostic system. The committee invited the membership to form groups 
to study the problem of diagnosis, “...but as far as could be determined, only one group met and 
that for only one discussion.” (Weinstock, 1965,p. 68).  
 
1.1.3. The DSM-I was not “infused” with psychoanalytic theory 
Horwitz claimed that the DSM-I was “infused with psychoanalytic” theory, and provided 
examples of the influence of psychoanalytic thinking in the DSM-I to prove his point (2015). 
One of the major families of disorders in the DSM-I were the “Psychoneurotic Disorders”. 
The first sentences from the DSM-I description for these disorders stated: 
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The chief characteristic of these disorders is “anxiety” which may be directly felt 
and expressed or which may be unconsciously and automatically controlled by 
the utilization of various psychological defense mechanisms (depression, 
conversion, displacement, etc.) . . . 
‘Anxiety’ in psychoneurotic disorders is a danger signal felt and perceived by the 
conscious portion of the personality. It is produced by a threat from within the 
personality (e.g., by supercharged repressed emotions, including such aggressive 
impulses as hostility and resentment), with or without stimulation from such 
external situations as loss of love, loss of prestige, or threat of injury. (APA, 
1952, pp. 31-32)  
Here the psychoanalytic influence is plain to see. If the definitions of all or even most of the 
mental disorders read this way, Horwitz's claim would be correct. 
The hierarchical organization of the DSM-I was a top-down system that was designed to 
reflect clinical thinking about psychopathology at the time. The DSM-I subdivided mental 
disorders into (I) those with an organic basis (“Disorders caused by or associated with 
impairment of brain tissue function”), (II) those for which an organic basis was unknown, 
(“Disorders of psychogenic origin or without clearly defined physical cause or structural 
change in the brain”) and (III) the “mental deficiency” disorders. The organic disorders were 
split into (I.A) acute (13 diagnoses) vs. (I.B.) chronic forms (26 diagnoses). The (II) non-
organic disorders were split into (II.A) psychotic disorders (20 diagnoses), (II.B) 
psychophysiological disorders (10 diagnoses), (II.C) psychoneurotic disorders (8 diagnoses), 
(II.D) personality disorders (22 diagnoses) and (II.E) transient situational personality 
disorders (10 diagnoses).  Notably, the DSM-I class of “personality disorders” was wide and 
heterogeneous, including not only what would now be considered personality disorders, but 
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also sexual deviations, addictions, and “special symptom reactions”, such as speech 
disturbances and enuresis. 
Of the 127 diagnoses in the DSM-I (including non-diagnostic terms), there were 44 
categories that could be said to have partly psychoanalytic definitions: the 
psychophysiological disorders, the psychoneurotic disorders and the personality disorders 
(minus 6 diagnoses under Sociopathic Personality Disturbance). Thus, 35% of the diagnoses 
in the DSM-I could be said to be psychoanalytic. In contrast, 46 of the DSM-I diagnoses 
(36%) descended directly from Kraepelin's classification (e.g., general paralysis, 
schizophrenic reaction (dementia praecox), manic-depressive psychosis, etc., see Aragona, 
2015, for a useful chart showing similarities between the DSM-I and Kraepelin’s 
classification). As a result, categories with psychoanalytic terminology in their definitions did 
not represent the majority of diagnoses. The DSM-I drew as much on Kraepelinian concepts 
as it did psychoanalytic concepts. 
Of course, not all DSM-I diagnoses were of equal importance; some diagnoses were used far 
more frequently than others. If the psychoanalytically-influenced DSM-I diagnoses were 
those most used in practice then perhaps the DSM-I-as-used might be considered 
psychoanalytic. In 1955, a year when the DSM-I had been widely adopted and statistics are 
available, many psychiatric patients in the U.S. continued to be treated as inpatients. That 
year, public mental hospitals housed 559,000 patients (excluding those in VA facilities), 
while an estimated 379,000 were seen as outpatients (Kramer and Pollock 1958, Bahn and 
Norman, 1959). Amongst inpatients, the most common diagnoses were the schizophrenic 
reactions (51%), cerebral arteriosclerosis (9%), and mental deficiency (8%) (National 
Institute of Mental Health, 1964). Outpatient clinics at the time saw more children than adults 
(Bahn and Norman, 1959), and the most common diagnoses given to children were Transient 
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Situational Personality Disorders (36%), Personality Disorders (which in the DSM-I included 
diagnoses for learning disturbance, speech disturbance and enuresis) (21%), and Mental 
Deficiency (18%). The most common adult diagnoses in outpatient clinics were Personality 
Disorders (which included sexual deviations and addictions) (32%), Psychoneurotic 
Disorders (31%), and Psychotic Disorders (20%) (Bahn and Norman, 1959). Thus, both in 
terms of the numbers of categories included in the DSM-I, and in terms of the numbers of 
patients diagnosed, the psychoanalytically-influenced diagnoses, though significant, were not 
dominant.  
 
1.1.4. Contemporaries of the DSM-I did not consider it psychoanalytic 
Contemporary characterizations of the DSM-I support our claim. George N. Raines was 
chairman of the committee that produced the DSM-I. In his view, 
The present new nomenclature of The American Psychiatric Association 
follows…the general nomenclatural scheme of Adolf Meyer, utilizes the names 
originated by Kraepelin and Bleuler, and incorporates the dynamics developed by 
Freud and later analysts, wherever these are applicable. (emphasis in original, 
Raines, 1953a, p.425)  
Commentators from the time of the DSM-I saw both a Kraepelinian and psychoanalytic 
influence, 
It seems to be inconceivable that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental 
Diseases could have been written without the preceding work of Kraepelin. 
(Kahn, 1955, p.395) 
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The modern taxonomy adopted by the American Psychiatric Association is a 
direct descendant of the old Kraepelinian classification of mental disorders as 
definite disease entities. (Blinder, 1966, p.259) 
The definition of terms in the new nomenclature are largely descriptive…. In 
addition to the classical descriptive material, however, the revised nomenclature 
includes in its definitions a certain amount of psychodynamic theory as to the 
nature and origin of the conditions described (Bowman & Rose, 1951, p.165) 
With a prima facie case established that the DSM-I was not a purely psychoanalytic 
classification, we turn now to consider the way in which the DSM-I was developed. 
Demonstrating the influence that various prior classifications had on the DSM-I will 
further support our argument. 
 
1.2 Development of the DSM-I  
In producing the new manual, the American Psychiatric Association’s Committee on 
Nomenclature and Statistics, drew on two series of earlier classifications. The first of these 
systems was the Statistical Manual for the Use of Institutions for the Insane (1918) and its 
successor volumes (called Statistical Manual for the Use of Hospitals for Mental Diseases) , 
which was used to collect statistics on mental hospital populations (American Medico-
Psychological Association, 1918; APA, 1942). The second influence was classifications 




1.2.1.The DSM-I as descended from the Statistical Manual for the Use of Institutions for the 
Insane (1918) 
Gerald Grob (1991) reported that in 1908 the Bureau of the Census asked the American 
Medico-Psychological Association (later the APA) to appoint a Committee on Nomenclature 
of Diseases to assist with the collection of data. The Federal Census took a particular interest 
in those citizens who were dependent upon governmental care for their well-being, as it  was 
hoped that statistical knowledge could inform the development of appropriate public policy. 
The American Medico-Psychological Association created the requested committee in 1913 
and the first classification system, produced in collaboration with the National Committee for 
Mental Hygiene, was finally published in 1918, as Statistical Manual for the Use of 
Institutions for the Insane (American Medico-Psychological Association, 1918). 
The 1918 Statistical Manual organized mental diseases into 21 groups (families of disorders).  
Included in these 21 were groups such as traumatic psychoses (with 3 subdivisions), general 
paralysis (no subdivisions), psychoses due to drugs and other exogenous toxins (4 
subdivisions), and dementia praecox (4 subdivisions).  Thirteen of these 21 groups were 
“associated with organic brain disturbance” (in DSM-I terms).  Of the remaining 8 groups, 4 
were non-organic psychotic disorders.      
James V. May sat on the committee that produced the 1918 classification. His textbook 
Mental Diseases (1922) discussed the origins of the classification. May noted that 
Kraepelin’s classification had been introduced to the United States by Adolph Meyer and 
August Hoch and became widely accepted (May, 1922, p244). The 1918 classification sought 
to reflect the contemporary consensus within US systems (May 1922 p.247) and was thus a 
modified Kraepelinian classification. 
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The 1918 manual went through a number of different editions. By 1929 the APA 
Committee of Statistics celebrated the success of the manual (now renamed Statistical 
Manual for the Use of Institutions for Mental Diseases). 
The classification has been officially adopted by the Federal Census Bureau, The 
United States Public Health Service, the Surgeon-General of the Army, the 
United States Veterans Bureau, and by practically all the state hospitals for 
mental diseases in the United States. It is being taught in courses in psychiatry in 
many medical schools and is given with approval in the newer American text-
books in psychiatry (1929 report of APA Committee on Statistics, cited in 
Pollock, 1945,p. 10) 
The Statistical Manual sold in fair quantities.  The eighth edition (1934), for instance, 
sold 2700 copies in the first sixth-months of availability (APA, 1935, p.472), at a time 
when there were only 1510 APA members (APA, 1935, p.461). Compared to the 1918 
edition of the manual, in the eighth edition the section for psychoneuroses was greatly 
expanded (going from 4 to 17 sub-divisions) (Dayton, 1935). The tenth edition, 
published in 1942, remained very similar to the eighth, although the ordering of some 
classes was revised (APA, 1942).  
Published in 1952, the DSM-I was a continuation of this series of manuals for compiling 
hospital statistics. In comparing itself to the 10
th
 edition of The Statistical Manual, the DSM-I 
described itself as a continuation of an existing series rather than as a paradigm-breaking 
document. The introduction to the DSM-I suggests that “Perhaps the greatest change in this 
revision from previous listings lies in the handling of the disorders with known organic 
etiologic factors” (APA, 1952, p.9); the DSM-I introduced a distinction between acute and 
chronic brain disorders. Other key changes were said to be as follows: the schizophrenic 
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reactions increased in numbers and type (including a schizo-affective type, and childhood 
type, not included in earlier classifications (p.27)); the manic depressive reactions were 
reduced in number, but a new code “000-x14 Psychotic depressive reaction” was included 
(p.25); and new, or greatly expanded, sections of “Psychophysiologic Autonomic and 
Visceral Disorders” (psychosomatic disorders), Personality Disorders and Transient 
Situational Personality Disorders (reactions to stress) were added. Morton Kramer, Chief of 
the Biometrics Branch of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), prepared 
comparison sheets for contemporaries charting the main changes between the 10
th
 edition of 
the Statistical Manual for the Use of Institutions for Mental Diseases and DSM-I. In Kramer's 
view “there were not…many basic differences” (Gottlieb, 1952, p.7). 
1.2.2 The DSM-I as descended from Armed Forces Classifications 
During WWII each of the U.S. armed forces, and the Veterans’ Administration, developed its 
own classification for mental disorders. William C. Menninger was chiefly responsible for 
the Army classification, published as Technical Bulletin Medical 203 in 1943 (Houts, 2000). 
The classification caused some controversy. Menninger claims that he was initially 
discouraged from producing Medical 203 by the then chairman of the APA Committee for 
Nomenclature and Statistics (who would have been either Neil Dayton, chair 1942-1946, or 
Nolan Lewis, chair 1946-1948), and that the American Journal of Psychiatry refused to 
publish the classification (Menninger, 1947, p.582 ftnt 5). 
Medical 203 was heavily influenced by psychoanalytic theory. The introduction explained: 
The term “disorder” is used for the designation of the generic group of the 
specific reactions, while the specific reaction types have been termed “reactions”. 
The classifications of the psychoneuroses are based on the dynamics of the 
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psychopathology. Of necessity, a few terms remained descriptive (symptomatic). 
(Office of the Surgeon General, 2000 [orig. 1946], p.925) 
Compared to the classifications intended for hospital use, the emphasis of Medical 203 was 
reversed. The classification started with “Simple personality reactions” (which encompassed 
transient personality reactions to acute or special stress, combat exhaustion, and acute 
situational maladjustment). Neurotic reactions, “Character and behavior reactions” and 
“Immaturity reactions” also received prominent billing. In contrast, the sections on psychotic 
disorders, especially affective disorders, were fairly brief. Very little was said about organic 
conditions. While organic disorders made up at least half of the Statistical Manual for the 
Use of Hospitals for Mental Diseases, the organic disorders in Medical 203 were dealt with in 
a single paragraph, relegated to the end of the classification. 
In 1947 the Veteran’s Administration adopted a classification closely following Medical 203 
(Veterans Administration, 1947). In turn, a pamphlet titled “Joint Armed Forces 
Nomenclature and Method of Recording Psychiatric Conditions” was released in 1949 
(Army, U.S. et al., 1949). This sought to provide a common system for use in the Army, 
Navy and Air Force.  Much of the wording remained the same as in Medical 203 and the VA 
classification - although the ordering of disorders differed. Given the similarities between 
Medical 203, the VA classification, and the Joint Armed Forces classification in what follows 
we will talk of ‘Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces’ when all three classifications are being 
discussed. 
In places, especially in the schizophrenic reactions, psychophysiologic autonomic and 
visceral disorders, psychoneurotic disorders, and personality disorders, the text of DSM-I 
borrowed heavily from Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces. However, the influence of Medical 
203/VA/Joint Forces was limited. In 1949, the APA Committee on Nomenclature and 
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Statistics reviewed the VA classification but was not overly impressed: it worried that the VA 
classification reflected the requirements of “expediency” and “enthusiasms of a temporary 
nature” (APA, 1949b, p.930). Where DSM-I borrowed phrasing from Medical 203/VA/Joint 
Forces, often the most “psychoanalytic” wording was deleted. In practice, it looks as if the 
DSM-I committee wrote sections of the DSM-I by taking Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces text 
and crossing out what they considered to be controversial psychoanalytic claims. Compare, 
for example, Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces and the DSM-I on Obsessive Compulsive 
Reaction. The former described this reaction as follows: 
In this reaction the anxiety may be observable in connection with obsessional fear 
of uncontrollable impulses. On the other hand, the anxiety may be under apparent 
control, through a mental mechanism (isolation), by which the emotional charge 
becomes automatically separated from the main stream of consciousness and 
manifests itself in a displaced form through useless or excessive, and often 
repetitive activity. In the latter instance, the patient is utilizing the mental 
mechanisms of “undoing” – a symbolic act which temporarily protects the patient 
against a threat – and “displacement”. The patient himself may regard his ideas 
and behavior as unreasonable and even silly, but nevertheless is compelled to 
carry out his rituals. The diagnosis should specify the symptomatic expressions of 
such reactions, including touching, counting, ceremonials, handwashing, 
recurring thoughts, accompanied often by compulsion to repetitive action. This 
category includes many cases formerly classified as “psychasthenia”. (Office of 
the Surgeon General. 2000 [1946], p.928; Veterans Administration, 1947 p.5; 
Army et al., 1949,p7; italics and underlining added) 
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In the DSM-I, the last three sentences were almost identical (shown in underline). 
However, the initial part of the definition (shown in italics) was distinctly altered. The 
DSM-I version was more descriptive of the signs/symptoms of the disorder and was 
less about the theorized mental mechanisms that allegedly explained those 
signs/symptoms. 
In this reaction the anxiety is associated with the persistence of unwanted ideas 
and of repetitive impulses to perform acts which may be considered morbid by the 
patient. The patient himself may regard his ideas and behavior as unreasonable, 
but nevertheless is compelled to carry out his rituals. The diagnosis will specify 
the symptomatic expression of such reactions, as touching, counting, ceremonials, 
hand-washing, or recurring thoughts (accompanied often by a compulsion to 
repetitive action). This category includes many cases formerly classified as 
“psychasthenia” (APA, 1952, p.33) 
In contrast to the avowedly psychoanalytic orientation of Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces, 
the DSM-I presented itself a classification that “recognizes the present day descriptive 
nature of all psychiatric diagnoses” (APA, 1952, p.9).  Still, not all psychoanalytic 
phrasing was deleted before text was inserted into DSM-I. For example, both Medical 
203/VA/Joint Forces and the DSM-I described the paranoid personality as being 
characterized by a “tendency to utilize a projection mechanism” (APA, 1952, 
p.36;Office of the Surgeon General, 2000 [1946], p.929). In addition to borrowing 
wording from Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces in describing disorders, the DSM-I also 
adhered to the  terminology of the earlier classifications by often describing disorders 
as “reactions” (APA, 1952, p.9). 
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In summary, the influence of Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces on DSM-I was limited. Most 
obviously, about half of the DSM-I concerned organic disorders; Medical 203/VA/Joint 
Forces had no influence on these disorders. Among the non-organic conditions there were 
also a few notable differences. Hypochondrical reaction was included in Medical 
203/VA/Joint Forces but excluded from the DSM-I. Schizophrenic reaction, schizo-affective 
type and schizophrenic reaction, childhood type were in the DSM-I but did not appear in 
Medical 203/VA/Joint Forces.  
Brief note should also be made of the ICD-6, published in 1948 (World Health Organization, 
1948). U.S. psychiatrists played a key role in shaping proposals for the ICD-6, thus 
accounting for the similarities between the ICD-6 and the DSM-I (Frohlich 1961, p.87; 
Kendell, 1975, p.92). Although there are some differences between DSM-I and the ICD-6, 
attempts were made to ensure that DSM-I codes could be converted into ICD equivalents (as 
outlined in Appendix A of the DSM-I). The direct influence of the ICD-6 on the DSM-I 
appears to have been minimal. Schizophrenic reaction, schizo-affective type is the only ICD-
6 category included in the DSM-I that cannot be found in earlier U.S. classifications (either 
the military classifications or the Statistical Manual for the use of Hospitals for Mental 
Diseases).   
2. The DSM-I was influential 
As noted in the foreword of the DSM-I, one of the innovative steps in creating this 
classification was that the DSM-I committee distributed advance copies to 10% of the 
members of the APA and solicited feedback in the form of questionnaires.  Of the returns, 
93% expressed general approval of the new classification.  Raines noted that a number of the 
state hospitals and mental health clinics held staff meetings to discuss the new system and its 
changes. The efforts by Raines and his committee to pre-test the DSM-I probably helped this 
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classification in achieving its goal of becoming accepted by the clinicians who were its 
audience. 
During the 1950s, the American Journal of Psychiatry printed an annual note on the accounts 
of the APA. These recorded sales of the DSM-I as being $1,465 to March 1952, $10,305 
from April 1952 to March 1953, and $9,825 from April 1953-March 1954. From 1955 and 
1965 no sales figures were recorded (APA 1952b, 1953, 1954). The DSM-I thus made at least 
$21,595. The DSM-I sold for $1.50 (Felix, 1956, p.405).  This implies that the DSM-I sold 
over 14,000 copies in its first three years of publication. This equate to roughly two copies for 
each member of the APA (in 1952 the APA had 7105 members (APA, 1952, p.210)). The 
DSM-I classification was also reprinted in a number of textbooks (Masserman, 1955; 
McCartney, 1956; Menninger, 1952) and was used as the organizational basis for popular 
undergraduate textbooks, on abnormal psychology (Coleman, 1956), and psychiatry 
(Freedman and Kaplan, 1967).  
The DSM-I was used for a variety of purposes. A year after publication, one half of 
public mental hospitals, one third of private mental hospitals, and three-fourths of 
general hospitals were using the new nomenclature for patient records (Raines, 1953b). 
The annual statistical surveys, Patients in mental institutions, employed DSM-I 
categories (Public Health Service, 1958). Outpatient clinics likewise came to use the 
DSM-I; in 1956, 39% of State and VA outpatient clinics were reporting statistical data 
that included a DSM-I diagnosis (Bahn and Norman, 1959). Researchers also used the 
nomenclature of DSM-I categories (influential examples include Pasamanick et al., 
1957; O’Neal & Robins, 1958; Greenblatt et al., 1964). Stengel wrote an influential 
review of international psychiatric classifications for the World Health Organisation, 
who were concerned by the relative lack of impact of the ICD-6 on the international 
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psychiatric community (Stengel, 1959, p.605). In this review Stengel notes that “some 
other countries of the Western Hemisphere” had been considering adopting the DSM-I, 
and dedicates a special chapter to the classification “in view of its special importance” 
(Stengel, 1959, p.605).  Gruenberg's summary comment in his “Foreward” to the DSM-
II appears to have been an accurate assessment, “The first edition of this Manual (1952) 
made an important contribution to U.S. and, indeed, world psychiatry.  It was reprinted 
twenty times through 1967 and distributed widely in the U.S. and other countries.” 
(APA, 1968, p.ix).   
In summary, the DSM-I sold in large numbers and circulated widely. This being said, its use 
was by no means universal. When researchers found the DSM-I unsuitable for their purposes, 
they could ignore it and define the categories they studied descriptively in their papers. Some 
textbooks employed non-DSM diagnoses (for example, Arieti, 1959).  State hospitals in New 
York State never moved to the DSM-I system, but moved straight from using the 1942 
edition of the Statistical Manual to the DSM-II (Spitzer and Wilson, 1968). Although the 
DSM-I was available to psychiatrists to use as a common reference point, it could be ignored 
whenever a different approach seemed preferable.  
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
The generally accepted view of the DSM-I is that this system was psychoanalytic. This view 
is incorrect. The roots of the DSM-I came from (1) World War II military classifications that 
did contain psychoanalytic concepts, and from (2) earlier classifications by the APA that 
were Kraepelinian in focus and intended primarily for state hospital inpatient settings. 
Although U.S. psychiatry in the 1950s is often characterized as psychoanalytic in orientation 
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it is better described as eclectic. Articles in the American Journal of Psychiatry during this 
period were as likely to discuss somatic therapies, such as psychosurgery and ECT, as they 
were to discuss psychotherapy. Individual psychiatrists often combined ideas from a variety 
of schools in their own thinking. The DSM-I reflected this eclecticism and was a common-
sense compromise among the schools of thought in American psychiatry at the end of World 
War II. The DSM-I sold well and circulated widely. The current tendency to dismiss the 
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